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EVALUATION OF A SEPARATION ASSISTANCE DISPLAY IN A MULTI-ACTOR EXPERIMENT
J. Ellerbroek, M. M. van Paassen, M. Mulder
Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Delft University of Technology,
Kluyverweg 1, 2629 HS Delft, The Netherlands.
In the past, several display concepts have been developed, as aids in the task of airborne
self-separation. In several of these display concepts, thein erface helps the pilot solve the conflict,
as opposed to automation providing an explicit resolution.Especially in this case of manual
problem solving, (implicit) interaction between the actors in a conflict becomes an important factor.
An experiment was conducted to evaluate an EID-inspired, constraint-based separation assistance
display, where all aircraft in each conflict were controlledby pilot subjects. In the experiment,
several conflict scenario’s have been evaluated, where coordination between pilots could either
follow implicitely from the conflict geometry presented by the interface, or, require additional,
explicit rules (“rules of the air”) to be solved in a coordinated fashion.
In the current ATM concepts for unmanaged airspace, aircraft will fly completely predetermined 4D trajectories,
where automation will provide resolution advisories for traffic (or other) conflicts that may result from uncertainties
that arise during flight (RTCA, 2002; SESAR Consortium, 2007). In this situation, the pilot’s task will be one of
monitoring separation, and selecting and applying resolution advisories, provided by the automation. He should,
however, be able to judge the fidelity of a proposed resolution, and be able to intervene in case the automation fails.
Furthermore, because conflicts will be resolved in a decentralized fashion, determining the resolution to a
conflict will require coordination between the actors in that conflict. This means that for automated, as well as
manual conflict resolution, predictability of decisions will be essential to guarantee an acceptable level of safety. In
situations where there is not enough time for negotiation, implicit coordination will be required, e.g., by following a
predetermined set of rules that dictate which aircraft should maneuver, and how it should maneuver. In worst-case
scenarios, pilots will have to manually determine resolutin maneuvers, for instance when the automation has failed,
or other reasons why a pilot decides to resolve the conflict manually. This poses limits on the complexity of the
coordination rules. For automated resolution advisories,high rule complexity can make it difficult for pilots to
understand the rationale behind resolution advisories, potentially resulting in non-conformance and distrust of the
system (Schild & Kuchar, 2000; Lee & Moray, 1992; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
For adequate situation awareness, and proper interaction with automated systems, and between actors in a
conflict, it is therefore necessary for regulation and automation to be transparent and understandable to the operator.
The work presented in this paper is part of an ongoing study onthe design of a separation assistance interface that can
fulfil this role (van Dam, Mulder, & van Paassen, 2008; Heylen, van Dam, Mulder, & van Paassen, 2008;
Ellerbroek, Visser, van Dam, Mulder, & van Paassen, 2011). The display concepts developed in this study try to
realize proper support, by showing the implications of other raffic for the affordances of locomotion, and how they
relate to constraints that result from ownship performancelimits. By going beyond visualizations that relate only to
the automation logic, these displays help pilots gain deeper knowledge of the functions and relations within the work
domain. These displays should provide support in routine aswell as unforeseen situations, where the pilot may have
to rely on his own skills to resolve a conflict.
Figure 1: The horizontal separation assistance display is
based on a classical Boeing navigation display, with an
added separation assistance overlay. The overlay provides
a functional presentation of the affordances for aircraft
airspeed and track angle using a horizontal projection of
the three-dimensional velocity-vector affordance space.
The work presented in this paper will focus on the coordination rules that can be used with these display
concepts, in multi-actor resolution of traffic conflicts. Anexperiment was defined to evaluate coordination behavior
in worst-case scenarios, in which pilots have to resort to manual determination of conflict resolutions. In the
experiment, a horizontal, constraint-based separation assist nce display was available to the pilots to evaluate
conflicts, and to determine resolution maneuvers, see Figure1. The following two sections will present a set of
coordination rules that can be used with the display, and describe the experiment and discuss the results, respectively.
The paper concludes with a summary of these findings, and plans for future work.
Implicit coordination for manual control
For implicit coordination between actors in a conflict to function consistently well, a set of rules must be defined that
keeps pilots from selecting opposing resolutions. These rules may be based on extensions of the visual flight rules
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 1996), but in most cases, a cooperative resolution can also be derive
from the conflict geometry, see Figure2. This type of coordination is related to the conflict solution that results in
minimum path deviation. Consider the nominal aircraft position at timet:
x (t) = x0 +
∫ t
t0
Vorig (t) dt (1)








Using (2), it can be shown that the path deviation is minimized by miniz ng∆Vsol.
Figure2 shows a traffic conflict with two aircraft, and the derivationf their velocities relative to each other.
The circles visualize the horizontal separation margin around each aircraft, and the areas between the triangle lines
tangent to each circle show the conflicting values for each relativ velocity vector. In this figure,∆Vsol is the vector
distance betweenVrel and the nearest constraint zone leg. The shortest distance is found when∆Vsol is taken
perpendicular to the constraint zone leg (van Dam et al., 2008; Bilimoria, 2000). Figure2 also illustrates that, as long
asVrel is closer to one leg than to the other, a single optimum for∆Vsol can be found, and that both aircraft share
this optimum. Therefore, implicit coordination is guaranteed when the optimum is selected as a resolution.
For situations where there is no unique geometrically optimal solution, an additional set of rules is required.
For the experiment, the following ‘rules of the air’ were used: aircraft being overtaken have the right of way and
overtaking aircraft must remain clear by altering heading to the right. When two aircraft are approaching each other
head on they must both alter heading to the right.
Because the separation assistance display presents the pilot with a velocity action space that is based on the
conflict geometry, it can support both coordination strategies. Geometrically optimal solutions can be selected using
the display, by changing speed and heading to move the speed vector to the nearest conflict zone leg. Also, selecting
a velocity vector to the left, or to the right of a conflict areais nalogous to passing the intruder aircraft to the left or














implicit coordination, for all
conflict geometries with the
exception of collision
courses. Because of the
rotational symmetry of
constraint zones of both
aircraft, selecting the optimal
solution for aircraftACa will




To evaluate the coordination of manual resolution maneuvers b tween actors in traffic conflicts in unmanaged
airspace, a multi-actor, traffic separation experiment wasperformed. To obtain analyzable pilot responses, as well as
the interactions between those responses, pairs of pilots were placed in two-aircraft traffic conflict situations, witha
loss of separation in the near to short term future.
Method
Each session consisted of a continuous presentation of five conse utive conflict scenarios, that needed to be resolved
manually, with the aid of a constraint-based separation assist nce display. Traffic conflicts were always between two
human actors, and were designed using parametersconflict angle, time to first loss of separation, andCPA distance.
Apparatus and Aircraft Model:The experiment was performed on two physically separated, fixed-base
pilot stations. Each setup featured two LCD screens: one showing a Primary Flight Display, the other showing a
Navigation Display with separation assistance overlays. Participants could control display settings and auto-pilot
heading and speed modes through physical EFIS selector and Mode Control panels.
The aircraft models employed in the simulation were low-order, quasi-linear models of a Boeing 707-300,
and an Airbus A330, see table Table1. The model coefficients were obtained from EUROCONTROL’s BADA
aircraft database. The simulation was run in realtime, at anupdate rate of 100 Hz. The experiment was conducted
with zero wind, and no turbulence.
Experiment Design and Procedure:The experiment was designed as a within-subjects repeated-measures,
where factorsaircraft modelandconflict geometrywere varied. Theaircraft modelfactor was introduced to illustrate
the effect of a reduced speed margin on the availability of (optimal) resolution options. Because every aircraft type
suffers from reduced speed margins at increasing altitude (stall speed and critical mach number converge with
increasing altitude), speed margins are an important factor for conflict resolutions at cruise altitude.
The conflict geometry was designed based on three factors: conflict angle, time to first loss of separation,
and the distance between the two aircraft at the closest poinof approach. Here, the conflict angle determines the
shape and orientation of the constraint zone, and the magnitude of the closing speed between the two aircraft.
Varying conflict angle between scenarios, therefore, is a way to minimize memorizing/learning effects between
scenarios. The distance at the CPA,dCPA, determines whether a unique optimal solution to the conflict can be found
(dCPA 6= 0), or whether coordination based on an additional set of rules is required (dCPA = 0). The time to first
loss of separation varied between 3 - 5 minutes, which meant amedium to high level of urgency for each conflict
scenario. Each of the conflicts was designed with two participating aircraft.
Each experiment session required two subjects. These subjects w re invited and briefed separately, and were
not informed that the conflicting aircraft were controlled by a second participating pilot. After a briefing on the
experiment and the functioning of the separation display, subjects performed approximately one hour of training. To
avoid learning effects, but still reach a stable level of performance and sufficient understanding of the information
presented by the separation assistance interface, separatexample scenarios were used for training.
The measurement phase consisted of 10 conditions, presented in a randomized block design. Subjects
performed each scenario in both aircraft, resulting in 20 measurement trials per subject. The trials were combined in
blocks of five continuous conflict scenarios. This meant thatfor each set of five scenarios, all participating aircraft
were present in the same simulated airspace, during the course f the five trials. Aircraft that do not participate in the
current conflict were placed at different flight levels, to avid previous and future conflicts having an effect on the
affordance space of the current trial. After each trial, subjects were asked to fill in a short questionnaire concerning
their resolution decision.
Boeing 707-300 Airbus A330
TASmin [kts] 282.4 331.1
TASmax [kts] 530.1 471.5
TAScruise [kts] 485.0 432.0
Table 1:Relevant data for the aircraft models in the
experiment. The difference in cruise speed influences
conflict geometry, and the reduced speed margin for
the Airbus can limit the resolution possibilities.
Table 2:Rules and strategies for conflict resolution.
1. Safety has the main priority: Ensure sufficient separation at all times.
2. Avoid resolutions that result in parallel tracks.
3. If available, apply the geometrically optimal solution.
4. When a unique optimal solution is not available, apply rules of the air.
4a. An aircraft being overtaken has the right of way and the overtaking aircraft must remain clear
by altering heading to the right.
4b. When two aircraft are approaching each other head on they must both alter heading to the right.
4c. Aircraft from the right have the right of way. Remain clear by passing behind that aircraft.
Subjects and Instructions to Subjects:Sixteen experienced glass-cockpit pilots participated insets of two,
15 male, and one female. Experience in terms of flight hours per pilot ranged from2, 000 to 16, 700 hours. Subjects
were asked to perform an experiment, where they should resolv traffic conflicts in unmanaged airspace. They were
informed that the results would be used to evaluate a conceptfor a separation assistance interface. To avoid “gaming”
effects, (e.g., pilots creating, or prolonging conflicts onpurpose), pilots were not informed that there was a second
participant, and that they were, in fact, flying against a human “opponent”. Instead, they were told that during the
measurements, intruder aircraft could participate in the resolution of a conflict, by using certain automated logic.
Prior to the experiment, pilots received a short briefing on the geometrical concepts behind the display, how
to use the display, and on the experimental setup. An important aspect of this briefing was to instruct the pilot on the
rules and strategies for conflict resolution, see Table2
Dependent Measures:Dependent measures for this experiment consisted of several objective and several
subjective measures. Objective measures were thesolution choice per pilotin terms of vector change dimensions
(heading and/or speed), and applied tactic (optimal state change vs. rule of the air), and the level of cooperation
between pilots.Safetywas measured in terms of minimum separation, and the initialreaction time was used as a
measure ofperformance. These measures were constructed from recorded parametersposition, heading, and selected
speed and heading. Subjective measures consisted of onlineSA questions, and a post-experiment questionnaire.
Experiment Hypotheses:Several studies involving manual (horizontal) conflict resolutions found that pilots
prefer to keep velocity constant (Hoekstra, 2001; Steens, van Dam, van Paassen, & Mulder, 2008). It was therefore
hypothesised that the majority of the maneuvers would be heading-only. It was also hypothesised that conflict
geometries with a small, non-zero expected CPA distance result in the largest amount of opposing resolutions, as the
choice between the optimal solution and applying rules of the air is less clear for such conflicts. Conflict geometries
wheredCPA = 0 will show more coordination based on the rules of the air, whereas conflict geometries with large
expected CPA distances will mostly be solved implicitely, where pilots use the shortest-way-out principle.
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Figure 3: Maneuver dimensions sorted by conflict
angle and aircraft type (B = B707, A = A330).
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Figure 4: Level of cooperation between pilots sorted
by conflict CPA distance.
Results
The resolution maneuvers in the experiment can be grouped bythe flight parameters that were changed to resolve
each conflict. For horizontal conflict resolution the available maneuver options are heading and speed changes.
Therefore, solution choice is a categorical measure with four levels:no action, heading only, speed only, and
combined heading and speed. The selection of a maneuver will depend on conflict geometry, ai craft performance
limitations, phase of flight, and personal or airline prefernce. Table3 shows the maneuver choice average for the
entire experiment. As was hypothesised, the majority of theresolution maneuvers was heading only (almost 70 %),
which can be attributed to personal or airline preference (Hoekstra, 2001). Figure3 shows the maneuver choice
sorted by conflict angle and aircraft type. For conflict angles0◦, 180◦, and225◦ this figure shows that (nearly) no
speed maneuvers were used. These conflict angles result in (near) head-on or parallel (take-over) courses. In these
situations, speed changes have no effect other than speeding or delaying a loss of separation, and only heading
changes can be used to resolve such conflicts. A notable exception to the preference for heading resolutions is found
in the25◦ conflict angle scenarios, especially for the A330 (61% of the resolutions involved a speed change). In this
situation, large heading changes are required to resolve the conflict. Also, for the A330, the max. speed line hides the
tip of the intruder triangle, making it difficult to detect intruder intent, and impossible to determine the correct
coordination rule. Giving way to the intruder by slowing down might then be considered the safest course of action.
Figure4 and Table4 show the level of cooperation between pilots, by CPA distance, and on average,
respectively. Table4 shows that pilots selected opposing solutions in16% of the measured trials. This can be a matter
of insufficient training, but it can also be an indication of aweakness of the interface. The most prominent cause for
the opposing solutions was that the two pilots applied different rules:64% for scenarios wheredCPA = 0, and45%
for scenarios wheredCPA 6= 0. These are errors where the wrong rule is applied. For all values ofdCPA this can be
an indication that pilots could not reliably retrieve the required information from the display. In other cases, the
correct rule was applied, but an error was made while evaluating the rule (7% for dCPA = 0, and55% for
dCPA 6= 0). In scenarios wheredCPA = 0, the direction of the maneuver depends on a previously stored ‘rule of the
air’. Therefore, when a wrong maneuver is made in such a scenario, it is because the pilot did not remember the
applicable rule correctly. For scenarios wheredCPA 6= 0, the rule requires the direction of the maneuver to be
derived from the display. In such scenarios, an erroneouslyapplied rule can also be an indication that pilots could not
retrieve the required information from the display.
50% of the measured trials were solved cooperatively. Figure4 shows that this occured most frequently for
scenarios with the largest conflict CPA distance. In situations wheredCPA is large, the velocity vector of ownship is
close to the edge of the constraint zone belonging to the confli t. The optimal solution (the shortest way out of the
triangle) is clearly visible on the interface, and guarantees implicit coordination when both parties strive for minimu
path deviation. The scenarios with the smallest, non-zero CPA distance showed the lowest percentage of cooperation.
In these situations, the optimal solution is less evident, and the choice between applying the optimal solution or
applying the rules of the air becomes less clear.
The minimum separation was used as a measure of safety, by comparing the measured value to the defined
separation minimum. The separation minimum was violated in3 out of 160 measured trials. In all three cases, this
occurred during a premature return to nominal heading and speed, and in all cases, the incursion was minimal.
Reaction time was used as a measure of performance, but showed n significant variation across conditions.
As a subjective measure, pilots were quizzed randomly from aset of traffic awareness questions during the
experiment. Although most questions were answered correctly, there are two notable exceptions. When asked
whether the other aircraft was slower or faster than the own aircraft, pilots gave more unsure and wrong answers in
conflict scenarios where the tip of the conflict zone (which also indicates the tip of the intruder velocity vector) was
not visible on the display. Another question that was often answered wrongly was whether or not the other aircraft
participated in the resolution maneuver. This cue is visible from the movement of the conflict zone on the display,
which can be difficult for pilots to see without extra visual cues. Results from the post-experiment questionnaire also
identify this as the most important issue with the display.
Table 3:Percentages maneuver choice.
None 16.67 % Heading only 68.91 %
Speed only 3.85 % Heading and speed 10.58 %
Table 4:Percentages pilot cooperation.
Single pilot solution 33.97 %
Cooperative solutions 50.00 %
Opposing solutions 16.03 %
Conclusions
A multi-actor, traffic separation experiment was performed, to evaluate the coordination of manual resolution
maneuvers between actors in traffic conflicts in unmanaged airspace. Similar to previous studies, results from the
experiment showed a considerable preference for heading-only maneuvers. As expected, difficulties with implicit
coordination between actors in a conflict occurred for conflict geometries that do not clearly fall into a single
category of coordination rules.
In the experiment, sixteen pilots participated, in pairs oftwo. For practical reasons, this is already a
considerable amount of subjects. However, because of the naure of most of the measurements (i.e., categorical data
with uneven expectations for the outcome per category), sufficient statistical power in the data requires a sample size
closer to 50 groups, or 100 pilots, possibly even more. Because n experiment of this magnitude is difficult to realize,
a follow-up study has been initialized that employs pilot decision models in a Monte-Carlo simulation, in an effort to
identify the influence of behavioral characteristics on separation coordination and safety.
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